[World War II – 21st Army Group] | An important archive of maps and files documenting the allied campaign in Europe, from the early stages of planning for D-Day and Operation Overlord, to the German surrender

[World War II – 21^st Army Group]

An archive of high-level WWII maps, files, and other related items, that span the length of Allied resurgence in the European Theatre, beginning with the planning stages of D-Day in May 1943, through Operation Overlord and the Normandy Breakout in 1944, and on to the Occupation of Germany and the dissolution of the 21^st Army Group in August 1945; the collection comes from the General Staff of the 21^st Army Group, including papers from Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, General Sir Bernard Paget, and General Charles Leslie Richardson, the collection was retained by RASC Staff Sergeant Eric Norman Green, who served in an administrative capacity. 1943-1946

The most extensive and wide-ranging archive of WWII planning documents ever to have appeared at auction. The archive deals with important aspects of the allied campaign in Europe, from the early stages of planning for D-Day until after the German surrender. This is one of two WWII archives related to D-Day with associations to high level military commanders to have appeared at market (the only other being the smaller D-Day archive that was sold at Sotheby’s, New York, 5 December 2013, for $62,500). This archive also contains much more manuscript content than any other that we traced, and, among the 90 documents, at least 10 are unrecorded.

This archive is from the General Staff of the 21^st Army Group. As a command-and-control unit, or “headquarters formation,” the staff that were directly assigned to the 21st Army Group oversaw the translation of strategic intent into actionable orders, rather than engaging in direct combat. The commander (initially Bernard Paget, later Bernard Law Montgomery) was focused on the highest-level decision-making. Over time, Paget and Montgomery built out a staff that could divide the immense amount of labor needed to plan the operation, with Montgomery choosing many of his closest advisors from the North African and Italian campaigns.

By the spring of 1944, the general staff (G-Staff) had been organized with Brigadier Generals in charge of various bits of planning. BGS(ops) and BGS(plans) were the two most important strategic formations in this structure. BGS(ops) was responsible for translating strategic directives into operational orders, while BGS(plans) was charged with creating a coherent strategic framework focused on achieving target goals 4-6 weeks out. These roles were filled, respectively, by the close Montgomery allies David Belchem and General Charles Richardson. Additional divisions focused on gathering and analyzing information, organizing reconnaissance, personnel, reinforcements, and materiel.

The files in this archive were compiled for the leadership of the 21^st Army Group, and are associated with Generals Sir Bernard Paget and Charles Leslie Richardson, who were both part of BGS (Plans), and in a few instances with Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, who served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from November 1941 until 1946, making him a principal military advisor to Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the majority of the Second World War. 

Eric Norman Green, who retained these documents after the war, served in the Royal Army Service Corps, the logistical glue that underpinned the British Army. These non-commissioned officers were assigned to military leadership and general staff to act as secretaries and aides-de-camp. We see ties in this archive between Green and Richardson, including a document in which both of their names are highlighted. Green would have been trusted with organizing the files of General Richardson that constitute the present files. When Richardson changed command, Green likely kept some of the files for military continuity, as it appears that Green continued to serve in Germany following Richardson’s return to Britain. However, we have been unable to trace any additional information regarding Green that is not available in the archive. He clearly served with distinction, mentioned in the same round of military honors as Richardson (possibly reflecting a common sponsor). The paperwork supports his role in the 21st Army Group, and the little we can trace regarding his movements corresponds with that of the 21st Army Group staff. 

The archive can be organized into four distinct sections. They are:

A SIZEABLE DOSSIER OF CHIEF OF STAFF (COS) MEETING MINUTES AND REPORTS, a comprehensive accounting of the early stages of planning for Operation Overlord from the highest levels of the British Army. May 1943 – February 1944.

74 COS files (various sizes but most around 330 x 225 mm), largely relating to Allied military operations in Western Europe, discussing the planning of Operation Overlord and related activities, including Operation Cockade, the files likely prepared for General Richardson in his capacity as Brigadier General, Staff of the 21^st Army Group; various formats including mimeographic and printed documents or reports, folded tables and printed maps, the documents ranging in length from 1 to 43 pages, mostly a few pages long, many documents annotated, often bearing “seen by” notations, suggesting that they are retained copies meant to record that generals who were not present at the meetings had been informed of decisions and had seen the reports; the files hole-punched at top and bottom, and bound together with string and metal “T Bars”; General light toning and wear commensurate with age and use, including some short tears and small losses along the edges, as well as occasional creasing and dog eared corners.

Some of the more interesting documents in these COS files are:

Directive to General Morgan. Note By Secretary. (COS(43)215(O); Document 1; 26 April 43)

The annex to this document lays out the role of Supreme Commander for forces in Europe, eventually filled by Eisenhower. This is the final draft of the directive to General Frederick Morgan, appointing him Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) (referred to as COSSAC) and entrusting him with planning “A full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.”

Fighting French - Participation in Western European Theatre of War. (COS(43)261(O); Document 3; 19 May 43)

This document contains a translation of General de Gaulle's letter “instructing” the British to include the Free French Forces in plans for a ground invasion of Northern Europe. The British reply is also copied, and the designated structure of the headquarters of the Free French tasked with this mission. This follows on from Document 2 and is particularly notable as it is “issued for the personal use of C.I.G.S.,” referring to Alan Brooke.

Operation “Cockade” Memorandum by Controlling Officer (COS(43)302(O); Document 5; 11 June 43)

This outlines Morgan’s three major deceptive operations, designed to convince the Germans that a land invasion was imminent. This was intended as a distraction from other objectives. The three-part plan involved “Operation Starkey,” a proposed feint against the Pas de Calais area; “Operation Wadham,” against the western French ports; and “Operation Tindall,” against Norway. This document “is issued for the personal use of C-in-C Home Forces” (Bernard Paget). The comments on this plan issued by the Joint Planning Staff are provided in Document 6. That document, also with provenance to Paget, contains his notes of agreement or disagreement with various parts of the plan.

Operations from the United Kingdom - Plans in the Event of German Disintegration. (J.P.(43)178 Final; Document 8; 21 June 43).

This sixteen-page report, accompanied by a map showing the areas of German strategic importance, provides plans for Allied forces to take control of Germany in the event of the Wehrmacht’s sudden failure. This predicted 1918-type failure of the German military was a common topic of discussion, as can be seen in this dossier and in other parts of the archive (including in the Operation Eclipse map). However, as the war dragged on, the military generals became convinced that this would not occur. This became a point of contention with civilian Allied leadership, a debate discussed by Richardson in his autobiography. This debate is alluded to in the meeting minutes from Document 11.

Conference “Rattle” Memorandum by Chief of Combined Operations (COS(43)367th Mtg(O); Document 12; 7 July 43)

This is Lord Louis Mountbatten’s report on the high-level planning meeting that took place in Scotland at the end of June and start of July. Key decisions and proposals were made and reported here, including the decision to attack at first light and the logistics of the bombardment campaign and landing craft. The role of the C-in-C Home Forces (Paget) is mentioned regarding further study of the latter problem. Again, this is Paget’s copy.

Operation “Overlord” Combined Training of Naval Assault Forces (COS(43)324(O); Document 20; 19 June 43)

This is the first in a series of documents (this one by COSSAC) reporting on and discussing the availability of training grounds for allied forces to practice beach landings. Potential training sites and requirements for live ammunition practice are discussed. This document heralds the build-up of American troops in Britain. Documents 21 to 29 and several additional later documents follow this theme.

Operation “Overlord” Commentary by the Joint Planning Staff (JP(43)260(Final); Document 33; 3 August 43)

This report discusses the baseline requirements outlined by COSSAC that must be met before Overlord could be launched: that the number of total fighters available to the Germans must be reduced; that German reserves in France and the Low Countries cannot exceed twelve divisions; that no more than 15 quality divisions can be diverted from Russia; and that “the problem of beach maintenance over a prolonged period in the channel must be overcome” (The annotator, we presume Paget, adds a question mark to this last requirement, reflecting the lack of clarity here). Important annotations are present here, including a note that criticizes the calculation of relative strengths of forces. The annotator suggests that allied assault divisions should not be counted as it was unclear whether these divisions would be combat-worthy following the beach assaults, concluding that “Such balance leaves us inferior to the enemy. Additional key comments are listed in the Annex, including the approval of the choice of the Caen area and criticisms of COSSAC’s proposed rate of advance as overly optimistic based on the current state of the Sicily invasion (but suggesting a rate that would, itself, prove over-optimistic). Overall, the report is relatively critical. A secondary annex includes a day-by-day accounting of the buildup of divisions from D-Day to D+8. Overall, this document stands out as providing an extensive and in-depth critical analysis of the early planning of the operation. 

This document is issued “the personal use of 21 Army Group Col. Russell.” It appears that Russell was a secretary figure and given the similarity between the handwriting here and earlier in the archive it is likely that the annotations present here are Paget’s.

German Plans and Intentions During Second Half of 1943 (JIC(43)324(Final); Document 34; 3 August 43)

This is a fantastic assessment of the German mindset halfway through the war. It describes military intentions in the Italian, Balkans, Scandinavian, and Russian theaters, accompanied by two maps. A second section assesses the chances of attempting to force a political capitulation or coup in Germany, thus shortening the war. As per usual, the assessments tend to appear relatively over-optimistic, particularly in discussions of the Italian theater.

Extract from Mins of COS(43)180thMtg(O); (Document 36; 4th August 1943)

This document contains further discussions regarding the Overlord masterplan, focused on build-up forces, the development of artificial harbors, and other topics. The use of smoke as a covering aid, which Brooke brings up in other documents, is again discussed here, showcasing one of the many tactics that were the topic of extensive research and debate but never implemented.

Operations in North-West Europe - “Quadrant” Decisions ([28 August 43]; Document 54; [COS(43)199th Mtg(O)])

This is the first of a series of documents that deals with the Quadrant meeting in Quebec, the highest-level planning meeting regarding D-Day in which Allied leadership was presented with, and approved, the plans for the landings in Normandy. The conference was attended by Roosevelt and Churchill and its primary accomplishment was confirming the date and scope of Operation Overlord (the cross-Channel invasion of France) and agreeing that an American officer would command it. Crucially, the Allies also finalized plans for expanding operations in the Mediterranean (Italy and the Balkans) and committing to intensifying the air war against Japan. This document confirms the date of May 1, 1944 as the intended date for which Overlord was to be ready.

Fire Support of Seaborne Landings Against a Heavily Defended Coast (COS(43)770(O); Document 71; 7 January 1944)

This extensive document includes an extremely technical and detailed analysis of how best to neutralize nearshore enemy targets using naval artillery. Lessons from previous naval landings in Sicily are incorporated. The report uses, as an example, a suggested timeline of an attack against the heavily defended area of Montreuil-sur-Mer using knowledge of the current fortifications. The report likely uses this area, rather than Normandy, as it was more heavily defended and could be used to guide an attack in Normandy if defenses were increased there. The appendixes include two highly detailed maps showing German defenses at Montreuil-sur-Mer and Merlimont.

Commandos for Overlord (COS(44)31st Mtg(O); Document 73; 2 February 44)

This document, as well as portions of document 72 and 74, discusses the use of special forces in the Normandy operations. Sourcing of commando units, possible tasks, and current SAS deployments are all discussed.

OPERATION OVERLORD MAPS AND MEMOS, an archive of planning documents produced in the weeks prior to D-Day, focusing on special operations and the breakout from Normandy, comprising previously unrecorded maps and memos. 1944-1945

A group of six unrecorded documents, all marked “BIGOT Top Secret,” relating to the late-stages of planning Operation Overlord, comprising two maps, three memos, and one appendix, apparently compiled for General Charles Leslie Richardson, who was charged with planning the Breakout from Normandy; one map mimeographically printed in two colors with manuscript annotations, folded; the second map made up of three color printed sheets, originally joined, with extensive manuscript annotations showing projected troop movements; the three memos mimeographically printed in purple ink, with red ink stamps, various annotations, stapled, and housed in a period army Central Registry folder; the appendix a mimeographically printed folding table; generally in good condition but with soiling, creasing and wear commensurate with age and use, one of the maps is made up of three parts that had been glued together, but the adhesive has dried and the three parts are now separate.

The group comprises:

1. Copy No 1 “Overlord” Build-Up of Divisions, 15 April 1944.

This map was produced just two weeks after Richardson assumed command of the BGS(Plans) Division of the 21st Army Group, shows the planned troop buildup on Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword beaches. Airborne operations around Cabourg, the Cotentin Peninsula, and Sainte-Mere-Église, commando landings, and the planned rate of advance through Normandy are also demarcated. In manuscript, additional troop deployments of infantry, armored, and airborne divisions are noted, as well as the rate of deployment of these troops. The rate of advance is optimistic, with Normandy being liberated in full by D+20. This is distribution Copy No 1 of the map - the lowest distribution number on any D-Day material that we have yet handled. 

2. Appendix 1 to 20651/55/G Plans/Dated 7-May-1944.

A wall map of northwestern France dated 7 May 1944 that shows the intended breakout from Normandy, focusing on difficulties that Richardson envisaged troops encountering. This map shows the extent of the Norman “bocage,” the difficult terrain characterized by small fields and hedgerows which Richardson correctly predicted would slow the allied advance. The location of the bridgehead established by D+14 and the predicted German fallback positions are mapped, with breakout directions indicated. Pencil annotations appear to show predicted German troop numbers at various points along the coastline, although this is speculative and based on the similarities of numbers. All Overlord-related content on this map is present exclusively in manuscript.

3. Outline Plan for the Employment of SAS Troops In Overlord. HQ AIRTPS/TS/2500/G Copy No 2. 10 May 1944.

This 2-page document and it’s 1-page appendix focuses on the area surrounding Normandy. In addition to describing the sabotage and liaison operations, this second document gives troop strengths for each operation.

4. Memorandum for: General Montgomery. 26 May 1944.

A copy of a 2-page letter from General Omar Bradley (commander of the First US Army) to General Bernard Law Montgomery outlines the final plans for the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the Utah area. Of note is an entry regarding Sainte-Mere-Eglise:

“The 101st A/B Division will be dropped as originally planned except for one regiment in the vicinity of St. Mere Eglise. This regiment will be dropped further south in order to strengthen the defense from the south opposite Carentan. The 82nd A/B Division to be dropped with one regiment in the vicinity of St. Mere Eglise and two regiments just west of the Mederet and north of the Douve.”

The tone of the message is rushed, saying that Eisenhower be made aware of the plan as quickly as possible. Bradley concludes by hazarding that if his proposals are not accepted, the invasion of Utah Beach will be abandoned. The distribution list on this memo only contains five entries. This copy is unnumbered. 

5. SAS Troops Operation Instruction No. 1. 28 May 1944.

This 4-page document lists ongoing missions in France that would be conducted by the Special Air Service (SAS). Most of the missions require these squadrons to paratroop behind enemy lines between the dates of D-10 and D+4. The missions listed include Operation Titanic 4, Dingson, Samwest, Cooney, Bullbasket, Houndsworth, and Moses. These documents describe liaisons with the French Resistance, reconnaissance, and sabotage operations.

6. Details of SAS Operations. Appendix ‘A’ [To Instruction No. 1]. No Date, but 28 May 1944.

A large folding table relating to the “SAS Troops Operation Instruction No. 1.” listing 6 SAS squadrons, their drop zones, the size of their units, and various details for the dates between D+1 and D+4/5.

POST D-DAY DOCUMENTS, including maps, documents, and pamphlets related to 21st Army Group leadership and individual events following D-Day, such as the Battle of Caen, the German surrender, the British military occupation of Germany, and the dissolution of the 21st Army Group, many of the documents unrecorded, the group likely put together through the continued work of Sergeant Greene (several bear his signature) for General Richardson, who was military assistant to the Deputy Military Governor of the British Zone. 1944-1945. Most of this part of the archive deals with four distinct events:

1). The Battle of Caen, comprising a report and a map relating to the battle, likely included in the archive because of General Richardson’s advisory role on the bombing strategy for Caen, as described in his memoirs. Both are apparently unrecorded, though the lack of a title for the map makes the search difficult. The report and map are:

Extracts from 15 (Scottish) Div[ision] Int[elligence] Summary… 23 July 44.

2 pages, mimeographically printed on single sheet of pink paper (327 x 202 mm); soiling, creasing, rubbing and wear commensurate with age and use, with a few nicks along the edges, however the document is entirely readable with no loss to printing.

A report markecd “SECRET” describing the effects of aerial bombing on Caen and providing intelligence on the enemy. The document includes an intelligence report on information gleaned from two Austrian deserters, “not so much an interrogation as a friendly chat,” about various subjects, including Russian war crimes, morale in the Wehrmacht, German artillery capabilities, and the SS.

Operation Neptune (Map of Bridges surrounding Caen), no date, but July 1944.

Color-printed map, with overprinting in a few places; old folds, light soiling and toning, evidence of a pasted down overlay, perhaps once bearing the title.

A large-scale repurposed topographical map overprinted with “BIGOT TOP SECRET” and the location of various bridges surrounding Caen.

2). Operation Eclipse - a map illustrating an early plan for the division of postwar Berlin.

Berlin, Operation Eclipse / Overprint Revised Jan. 1945.

Aerial map (648 x 890 mm) printed in black and white, overprinted in purple; old folds, light toning.

This map illustrates one of the earliest postwar plans for occupying Berlin, codenamed Operation Eclipse, a Top-Secret collaboration between American and British forces. The plan would only take effect should the German military be on the brink of collapse. Because the first power to reach Berlin would gain invaluable intelligence and be able to dictate the pace of postwar development, The Allies’ plan was to airdrop tens of thousands of troops into the city and thereby beat the Russians in the Race to Berlin. From their foothold in the city, the Allies would then work with the Twelfth Army Group to open a line between Berlin and the Western Front. 

The map shows the planned division of the city into American, British, and Soviet sectors. It predates the Yalta Conference, which finalized postwar occupation arrangements and added a French sector. The divisions on the map follow agreements made during the September 1944 London Protocol, which divided the city into northwestern, southwestern, and eastern zones.

We locate a single example of this map at the BL. We also trace a reference to overprint maps of Germany in the US National Archives and the US Army War College, which may include this map.

3). The German Surrender, comprising two documents, both printed in the days before the official announcement.

[First Announcement of a Ceasefire Between Germany and Western Allies] 21 A Gp/00/472/Ops(A). 4 May 1945.

1-page document (238 x 187 mm), mimeographically printed, signed by Green in pencil; minor creasing, otherwise fine.

“All offensive ops will cease from receipt this signal. Orders will be given to all tps to cease fire 0800 hrs tomorrow Saturday 5 May.”

A short but important memo issued to officers in the 21st Army Group announcing the surrender of German forces in Northwest Europe. The memo follows the surrender at Lüneburg Heath, south of Hamburg, accepted by General Bernard Law Montgomery in which over 1,000,000 men were ordered to lay down their arms. This was the first ceasefire on the western front that would eventually culminate in the unconditional surrender of Germany four days later in Berlin. The document is timestamped from 20:50 on the day of surrender and orders the immediate cessation of all offensive operations outside of the Dunkirk area.

Silver Bullets: Werewolves for destruction / SECRET / 535/11/G(SD) / 7 May 45.

1 page document, (330 x 203 mm), mimeographically printed; light creasing, a few small stains, a nick and a loss at the bottom edge.

A bizarre, obviously spurious, document, describing, in formal military jargon, the mythology of werewolves. The document was issued on 7 May 1945, between the signing of an unofficial surrender in Reims on the 6th and the final surrender of Germany in Berlin on the 8^th. It suggests that “werewolves are only susceptible to penetration by a silver bullet” and that the “firer must be a person of blameless morals.” A particularly humorous section asks whether “there is any difference [in moral standing] before and after the firer has proceeded on 72 hours short leave.” The likeliest explanation for this document is as a reference to the Nazi “Operation Werewolf,” where SS and Hitler Youth members were planted behind enemy lines to execute terrorist activities – perhaps the memo is meant to remind soldiers to stay on their guard, while implicitly acknowledging the joyous feelings associated with the upcoming V-E celebrations. We have been unable to trace any further examples of this document.

4). The Military Occupation of Germany, comprising four documents.

Talk to Control Commission by Field-Marshal Montgomery. No date, but circa May or early June 1945.

6-page document (330 x 202 mm), mimeographically printed, stapled, with pencil annotations; light soiling, the staple rusted, the final page detached.

In Montgomery’s characteristically direct tone, this document outlines his plans for the British military governance in postwar Germany. It focuses on maintaining military hierarchies and continuing close relations with American troops, while acknowledging the difficulties that will undoubtedly arise with attempting to establish a civilian government in Germany. Issued sometime in late May or earliest June, 1945, the memo is optimistic about future collaboration with the Russians.

The verso of this example contains manuscript notes, presumably by Richardson, documenting travel at some point in early June, 1945. It lists a flight to SHAEF headquarters (Frankfurt) on a Monday, meetings with SHAEF and the 21st Army Group, and various points of discussion including paramilitary groups and demobilization of planning staff in London.

We trace two copies of this memo at the National Archives.

Incidental Matters Arising Out of the Visit of Major J. R. Little R. A. to Magdeburg Area [stapled to] Extracts from Report on Agfa Plant, Wolfen, both dated 3 July 1945

Printed documents, 4 pages and 2 pages respectively, stapled together, the first stamped “SECRET”; general wear commensurate with age and use.

These two memos, originally issued as appendices to military government reports, encompass two reports by allied personnel who visited Soviet occupied territory. A central theme in both reports is the discovery of the widespread Soviet practice of removing German heavy industry to Russia. The reports describe how some of the most important German factories, including those operated by I.G. Farben, Siemens, and AGFA Film Fabrik, were being dismantled and moved to Russia. The methods for persuading German industrialists to partake in this was straightforward - first, they were politely asked whether they would be willing to consider relocating their operations to favorable areas in the Urals, and then, when the industrialists inevitably refused, food rations were then withheld.

The reports also cover the relations between the Russians and the Germans, discovering that significantly more fraternization was occurring than between Western Allies and the Germans. They also discuss the effectiveness with which Russians control their territory, and the rate at which they expect the dissemination of Communism from the Russian Zone westwards. Clear concerns are expressed that Russia is gaining the upper hand in the occupation, although one silver lining remains: anecdotal reports emerged that British troops who had contact with Russian soldiers were significantly more likely to vote Tory. We have been unable to trace any further examples of these memos.

Standing Committee for the Increase of the Population (German/British). 23 July 1945.

1-page printed document; old folds, a few pale spots, some tiny losses along folds mostly at edges, larger loss at upper corner, but with no losses to printing. 

Another humorous spurious memo, describing how English soldiers should help rebuild Germany by “doubling or even trebling the number of births.” The memo, issued by a major “I.B. Standing” supersedes previous rules on fraternization to suggest that the recipient is given charge of repopulation in a specific Stadt. An exhibition of suitable women and maidens is ready for the recipient, and it is duly noted that “It must be pointed out that your wife or fiancée will not be able to claim divorce or breach of promise, and it is hoped that the women will bear the discomfort for the sake of their nation.” We have been unable to trace any further examples of this memo.

British Army of the Rhine | Personal Message from the C-IN-C. 7 September 1945.

2-Page document, mimeographically printed; Old fold, a few small losses, tears, and creases, not affecting the printing.

This letter from September 1945, issued by Bernard Law Montgomery to troops of the 21st Army, outlines the restructuring of British troops in northwestern Europe as “The British Army of the Rhine.” The letter outlines the conflicts and difficulties that Montgomery foresees in the postwar era and alludes to the coming Cold War geopolitics.

There are a few additional items from this portion of the Richardson archive, including a series of guidances issued on fraternization with civilians, and a typed copy of a news report by the Daily Express casting aspersions on parts of the military.

A MISCELLANY OF STAFF SERGEANT ERIC NORMAN GREEN’S PERSONAL FILES, AND VARIOUS PIECES OF 21^st ARMY GROUP MEMORABILIA, including Green’s personnel files, some personal correspondence, his cloth stripes, and other items he accumulated along the way, some tying Green to General Richardson and placing him as a member of the Royal Army Service Corp; together with a group of pieces relating to the 21st Army Group, including a number of messages from Montgomery, Eisenhower, and Frederic de Guingand distributed to all troops and officers, such as Eisenhower’s famous “Great Crusade” pamphlet and Montgomery’s “Good Hunting” personal message, both handed out to troops on the evening before D-Day. Additional post-war material from the 21st Army Group is also present.