Lot 1055
  • 1055

(George Washington and George Cabot)

Estimate
2,000 - 3,000 USD
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Description

  • Manuscript copy of letters by George Washington and George Cabot to Timothy Pickering regarding who would be second in command of the army during the Quasi-War with France
  • Paper, ink
One page (7 3/4 x 6 1/4 in.; 200 x 158 mm) on a bifolium [Philadelphia?, autumn 1798], lengthy endorsement about the situation on verso ("It appears … that very great apprehensions were entertained of a … war with France …"), docketed on verso of integral blank ("Sept 9. 1798 | W to Pickering").

Condition

1 1/2 pages (7 3/4 x 6 1/4 in.; 200 x 158 mm) on a bifolium [, autumn 1798], docketed on verso ("Sept 9. 1798 | W to Pickering").
In response to your inquiry, we are pleased to provide you with a general report of the condition of the property described above. Since we are not professional conservators or restorers, we urge you to consult with a restorer or conservator of your choice who will be better able to provide a detailed, professional report. Prospective buyers should inspect each lot to satisfy themselves as to condition and must understand that any statement made by Sotheby's is merely a subjective qualified opinion.
NOTWITHSTANDING THIS REPORT OR ANY DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING CONDITION OF A LOT, ALL LOTS ARE OFFERED AND SOLD "AS IS" IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF SALE PRINTED IN THE CATALOGUE.

Catalogue Note

Intrigue over who would serve directly under Washington during the Quasi-War with France. Harold C. Syrett wrote that this "unseemly squabble ... in one way or another damaged the reputation of most of those who were directly involved" (Papers, 22:4). 

When reports of Talleyrand's insulting treatment of American ministers Charles Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry inflamed the American public and congress alike, President Adams recommended raising a provisional army to strengthen the nation's defenses. On 22 June 1798 Adams had written to Washington and admitted that should he have to form an army, he would be "at an immense Loss whether to call out all the old Generals, or to appoint a young sett" (Papers of George Washington, Retirement Series, ed. Abbot, 2: 352). Washington replied, 4 July, that while he had not anticipated having again to "turn my eyes from the shades of Mount Vernon ... In case of actual Invasion by a formidable force, I certainly should not Intrench myself under the cover of Age & retirement, if my services should be required by my Country, to assist in repelling it" (Papers, Retirement, 2:369).

And so on 13 July 1798, George Washington reluctantly accepted President John Adams's appointment as "Lieutenant General and Commander in Chief of all the Armies raised or to be raised for the service of the United States," thus consenting, as he explained to Alexander Hamilton the next day, "to embark once more on a boundless field of responsibility & trouble" (Papers, Retirement Series, 2:407). Washington had explicitly told Adams that his acceptance was predicated on the caveat that he need not be called into the field until his presence was indispensable. But through back channels he had expressed a second reservation to the President, which he also shared with Hamilton: "that the principal Officers in the line, and of the Staff, shall be such as I can place confidence in. ..."

The act of 16 July authorizing the raising of a new army called for the appointment of three major generals. Washington's choices for these commissions were, in order of precedence, Hamilton, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Henry Knox. In this order of rank, the nominations were approved by the Senate. But factions within New England, perhaps encouraged by Knox himself, agitated for the elevation of Henry Knox to second in command, based on his seniority at the end of the Revolutionary War. In a confidential letter of 1 September, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering alerted Washington that Adams seemed prepared to flip the positions of Knox and Hamilton.

Washington subsequently indicated to Adams that he was prepared to resign his commission if the right of establishing precedence of rank among the major generals of the army was denied him, and Adams yielded the point.

Someone in the Hamilton camp kept him apprised of the situation, likely at the behest of either Pickering or Secretary of War James McHenry, sending this extract of correspondence relative to the matter:

"Gen: Washington to Col. Pickering 9 Sepr. 1798

"'What, in the name of military prud cd induced the appointments of White & Severe as Brigadiers? The latter never was celebrated for any thing (that ever came to my knowledge) except the murder of Indians—& the former, for nothing but frivolity, empty shew, & something worse.'—NB W. put White among the field officers of n Jersey 'merely as one that might be considered for that grade'—but said 'the certn csqn of it will be m.y of the 8 val of them,' (the revolutionary officers) ('to the S.ward where he was bst kn.) will not be his Juniors'—Wanted Dayton or Gen Hand." (The full text of the letter of which this is an extract is printed in Papers, Retirement, 2:596–599).  

The second extracted letter was sent to Pickering by George Cabot, a Massachusetts merchant and politician (and a champion of Hamilton), on 15 September 1798: "Knox displeased with H's rank: strenuously supported by Gen. Lincoln—'the principal reason for this extraordinary conduct is probably to be found in the peculiar circumstances of Gen Lincoln who is an endorser of Knox's notes which are floating in this quarter to a very great amount.'"