- 40
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Estimate
6,000 - 8,000 USD
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Description
- paper, pen
A fountain pen by Esterbrook, the barrel of black plastic, the stem of clear plastic, etched in white ink along the barrel: "The President - the White House | S.E. Asia Resolution | 10 August 1964": total length 6 1/2 in.; 150 mm. Together with: Retained typescript carbon memorandum, 3 pages (10 1/2 x 8 in.; 265 x 200 mm), signed in type ("Robert S. McNamara"), [Washington, DC], 26 April 1965, to President Johnson regarding the events leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, marked "Confidential" along the top and bottom margins in purple ink; two punch holes along top margin.
Catalogue Note
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the rapid escalation of the war. On 2 August 1964 the USS Maddox, while on an electronic intelligence collection mission, was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Two days later, according to McNamara's report, "North Vietnamese boats again attacked our destroyers [the Maddox and Turner Joy] ... On August 5, U.S. planes retaliated in a limited fashion against naval bases where were the home ports of boats and the oil storage area at Vinh which supported them ... The U.S. retaliation did not extend beyond August 5." A later investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee learned that the U.S. Naval Communication Center in the Philippine Islands, in reviewing ships' messages, questioned whether a second attack had actually occurred.
The balance of the memo recounts numerous acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Viet Cong against South Vietnamese citizens and U.S. personnel. After lengthy debate, Congress voted on 10 August 1964 on a joint resolution which authorized the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The resolution is of historical significance because it authorized the president, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia. While McNamara's memo represents the president's willingness to negotiate a peace with the North Vietnamese, the administration relied upon the resolution to begin its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and open warfare in North Vietnam.
The balance of the memo recounts numerous acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Viet Cong against South Vietnamese citizens and U.S. personnel. After lengthy debate, Congress voted on 10 August 1964 on a joint resolution which authorized the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." The resolution is of historical significance because it authorized the president, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia. While McNamara's memo represents the president's willingness to negotiate a peace with the North Vietnamese, the administration relied upon the resolution to begin its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and open warfare in North Vietnam.