Beauregard, Pierre Gustave Toutant, Confederate General

Letter signed ("G T Beauregard"), 4 pages (10 x 7 3/4 in.; 255 x 196 mm) on blue paper letterhead "Head Quarters Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida," Charleston, SC, 7 October 1863, to General Braxton Bragg "near Chattanooga Tenn.", disbound with tiny stitch holes in extreme left margin

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, vol. 28, part 2, page 399

Beauregard denounces the failed Pennsylvania campaign and the coming campaign to cut off Meade.

Beauregard’s reputation was undermined by his decision to call off the attack on Grant’s defensive line at the battle of Shiloh (6 April 1862) only to be driven back to Corinth by a counter-offensive under Buell. He then withdrew from Corinth without a fight due to disease and overwhelming Union forces, but Jefferson Davis relieved him of command in Tennessee, transferring him to Charleston South Carolina, and replacing him with General Braxton Bragg. Beauregard took command of coastal defenses in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, but he was unhappy with his new command, and this comes out in the present letter written to his replacement.

Beauregard begins: “I have just been informed from Richmond that the Army of Va is about to take the offensive again to prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans, thus repeating, to a certain extent the campaign of last July into Pennsylvania which did not [his emphasis] save Middle Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley! “ He reminds Bragg of his efforts to prevent the Pennsylvania campaign, and now offers his critical views on the “intentions of General Lee or the War Dept, to see if our small available means cannot be used to a better purpose.”

He admits that Lee’s movement can prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans but this will simply drive Meade across the Potomac, while Rosecrans will be reinforced in one month’s time by men “from Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri & the Mississippi Valley.” Admitting that Rosecrans “has now about your own supposed effective force, say 60,000 men of all arms, he will then have about 110,000 men against 60,000. War being a contest of ‘Masses against fractions’ all other things being equal, you would certainly be defeated! … the Confederacy now cut in two, would then be cut in three. “

He goes on to speculate that the newly reinforced Meade would drive Lee towards Richmond “admitting that his supplies would enable him to maintain his army that long on the S side of the Potomac. Or, a large army might be concentrated here & having taken this place & marched into the interior towards Augusta, the Confederacy would again be sub-divided …” and he goes on with further Cassandra-like premonitions.

His frustration now is made manifest: “The question now arises, can these calamities be avoided & in what way? If my opinion for once could be listened to, I would say again, act entirely on the defensive in Va, send you immediately 25,000 men from Lee’s Army & 5000 or 10,000 more from Johnston’s forces to enable you to take the offensive forthwith, & cross the Tennessee to crush Rosecrans before he can be reinforced to any large extent from any quarter …” allowing Bragg to defeat the reinforcements intended for Rosecrans, while Lee could reinforce the lines around Richmond. He asks Bragg, if he approves, to address this plan to the War Department as his own. “What I desire is our success — I care not who gets the credit for it — our resources are fast getting exhausted, our people, I fear, are getting disheartened, for they can see no bright spot in the horizon to revive their drooping hopes after the patriotic sacrifices they have made in this terrible contest. Let us then unite all our efforts in a last deadly struggle & with God’s help we shall yet triumph.”