Lincoln, Benjamin

Letter signed ("BLincoln"), 8 pages (9 x 7 1/2 in.; 228 x 190 mm), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 24 September 1782, to John Lowell, marked "private" in upper left corner of first page, docketed on first page; formerly folded, tears in central fold mended in first bifolium but second bifolium separated, a few fold tears one of which mended with cello tape, some soiling at folds. Red half-morocco clamshell box.

microfilm reproduction in F. Allis, Papers of Benjamin Lincoln (13 reels, 1967), reel 6

formerly folded, tears in central fold mended in first bifolium but second bifolium separated, a few fold tears one of which mended with cello tape, some soiling at folds.
In response to your inquiry, we are pleased to provide you with a general report of the condition of the property described above. Since we are not professional conservators or restorers, we urge you to consult with a restorer or conservator of your choice who will be better able to provide a detailed, professional report. Prospective buyers should inspect each lot to satisfy themselves as to condition and must understand that any statement made by Sotheby's is merely a subjective qualified opinion.
NOTWITHSTANDING THIS REPORT OR ANY DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING CONDITION OF A LOT, ALL LOTS ARE OFFERED AND SOLD "AS IS" IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF SALE PRINTED IN THE CATALOGUE.

The country's first debt crisis, the imbalance of power between the union and the states,  " ... a heavy cloud is fast gathering over the United States ... it will burst and sweep away our feeble confederation and endanger if not overturn the union of these States."

After accepting the surrender at Yorktown, Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810) was appointed the first Secretary of War in 1781, while the Revolutionary War was slowly winding down. The country's financial situation was deteriorating over the summer of 1782 as the states continued to ignore congressional requisitions. Lincoln's pleas for money to pay troops met with little success and the supply of funds from Robert Morris were running out. Morris hoped to levy an import duty to supply Congress with money independent of the states, but asked influential gentlemen to write to prominent men in their respective states, to pressure the states to answer the requisitions. The present fine, lengthy letter is one of Lincoln's efforts to comply. John Lowell (1743-1802), patriarch of the Boston Lowells, was at this time delegate to the Confederation Congress in Philadelphia.

Lincoln continues his warning (after the above quotation): "Most of them [i.e. the States], some, however, without a just foundation, are complaining that they have borne more than their proportion of the expences of the War and that the United States are greatly indebted to their Inhabitants, who they Say, look to them for protection, justice & relief. I find that those States have it in contemplation to settle the debts due from the United States to their own Inhabitants, charge the United States with the sum, and deduct it from any requisition of Congress which has been made upon them." This plan would further undercut the authority of Congress and make it impossible to carry on the war: "The moment the several States think they have this right ... we may date the loss of the Confederation, the annihilation of the Union and the ruin of the States."

He proceeds to analyze the imbalance of power between the union and the States. He does not think that the Morris plan for an import duty will be passed.  But he does not believe that the power of Congress should be increased:  "Much has been said relative to our confederation: that it wants revising, and that more powers should be lodged in the hands of Congress. It may be so, but I do not consider that as the cause of our present embarassment, or that we should receive any very essential advantages, should such a measure take place. There is no medium between the powers they now have and a power of coercion. We must therefore either submit to the present mode of doing business or delegate to them a power to coerce the delinquent States. Were they delegated with this power, how would it operate ... Would they send an armed force among them? ... Where would they collect their force? ... It will be difficult for Congress to arm one State against the other, and equally impolitic ..."