Washington, George, as Continental Commander

Letter signed ("Go: Washington"), text in the hand of Robert Hanson Harrison, 6 pages including a full-page postscript (12 1/8 x 7 3/8 in.; 307 x 188 mm) on a bifolium and single leaf (watermarked plow Work & Be Rich | ppd), "Head Quarters West point," 18 October 1779, to Colonel Daniel Brodhead; fold separations with unskilled repair occasionally partially obscuring a word. Half blue morocco folding-case.

The Writings of George Washington, ed. Fitzpatrick, 16:485–88 (text from the draft, with several variations in word order and many in capitalization, punctuation, and other incidentals); see John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making in the Frontier, 1607–1814  (Cambridge, 2005)

A highly significant letter about one of the most critical, but often overlooked, aspects of the American Revolution: the war against the British and their Indian allies on the patriot frontier. 

A series of bloody Indian-Loyalists raids against frontier settlements in New York and Pennsylvania in 1778 and 1779 convinced Congress "that an army of overwhelming strength turn its full fury on the Sencas. ... In one of the most complex American operations of the War of Independence, Congress directed that three separate armies—under Major General John Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton, and Colonel Daniel Brodhead—sweep across New York and converge near Tioga. From Tioga, the combined army, Sullivan noted, would 'totally extirpate the unfriendly nations of the Indians, to subdue their country, destroy their crops, and drive them to seek habitations where they would be less troublesome to us and our allies'" (Grenier, pp. 166–67). Washington here congratulates Brodhead on his "success in the expedition up the Alleghany against the Senocca & Muncy Nations—and transmit you the inclosed Extract from General Orders, which will convey to you the sentiments I entertain of your conduct and that of the Officers and Men employed in the expedition. This you will be pleased to communicate to the Troops thro the Channel of your Orders." The General Orders referred to by Washington (the referenced copy of which no longer accompanies the letter) acknowledged the "Activity, Perseverance and Firmness which marked the conduct of Colonel Brodhead" and his command in their destruction of Muncy and Seneca towns on the western frontier (Writings 16:480–81).

In coordination with Brodhead, John Sullivan was pursuing a campaign of "total destruction and devastation" againt the Iroquois people of central New York, and Washingon anticipates that the Native American allies of the British will soon be forced from the field: "I trust from this stroke and the operations of General Sullivan, who, I am happy to inform you, is now on his return to join the Army, after having laid waste the whole of the Senocca Towns—their Crops & their Country, except in the Quarter where you were, and a Town or Two higher up on the Alleghany, and compelling the whole of the Nation to flee to Niagara for refuge, the eyes of the Savages will be opened—and that they will be convinced, that it will be their true interest & policy at last to hold themselves in a state of neutrality." Washington also gives Brodhead permission to divide the booty taken by his expedition in a form of infantry privateering: "I approve the sale you directed of the plunder and of the distribution of the profits among the Troops."

Washington assures Brodhead that he has forwarded his questions about clothing and pay for his men to, respectively, Col James Wilkinson, Clothier General, and Lt. Col. William Palfrey, Paymaster General. The commander in chief also explains his objections to an expedition against Detroit, which both Brodhead and William Rogers Clark were eager to mount. "With respect to an Expedition against Detroit—I cannot at this time direct it to be made, as the state of the force at present with you, is not sufficient to authorise the clearest hopes of success and indeed to ensure it; and because it is not in my power circumstanced as things are at this critical moment, to say how far it may be practicable to afford sufficient aid from hence. In any other view than that of a certainty of success, I would not undertake the reduction of the post, as a miscarriage would be attended with many disagreeable consequences. However, as it is of great importance to reduce it, and I shall willingly attempt it when ever circumstances will justify it, you will turn your closest attention to the subject, and make such preparations & obtain such necessary information as may be in your power, without exciting much alarm, as may facilitate the work when ever it is undertaken, either this winter when the lake is frozen, which appears to me the only season when an effectual blow can be struck—or next Campaign. In the mean time the nature and strength of the Works should be ascertained—whether there are any & what kind of Bomb proofs—what aid could be drawn from the Country, of Men, provisions, Horses, &c—what opposition or aid might be expected from the Indians & of the prospect of Supplies."

Despite cautioning Brodhead against an advance on Detroit, Washington tells him that he has "no objection to your making occasional excursions against any of the Indian Nations that may prove inimical & hostile, when circumstances will permit you to do it with safety." But, Washington advises, Brodhead should confine himself to field operations: "The powers of making peace or War are in general cases, which affect the common interest, entirely with Congress as they ought of right to be. And therefore—if overtures of peace are made by the Senecca and Muncies—you will communicate the same to them, who will act in consequence; either by appointing Commissioners or otherwise, as to them shall seem most proper."

Brodhead had sought from Washington instruction on how to treat with the actions of George Rogers Clark, as well as assistance in obtaining gifts for friendly Indians. The commander replies, "Colo. Clark is not an Officer in the Continental line—nor does he act under my instructions. He is in the service of the State of Virginia. I make no doubt however, that the Instructions he has received are calculated to promote the general good; and from the character he seems justly to have acquired, I should suppose he will act with caution and prudence—and do nothing that will not be promotive of it. With respect to supplies and Trinkets for the Indians—You must try to keep them in the best humour you can—and I dare say on your application to the Honble. the Board of War, they will direct such to be furnished, as may be in their power to procure."

In concluding the letter, Washington turns his attention from the frontier to the Southern theater. "We are anxiously waiting for advices from the Southward. His Excellency Count D'Estaing arrived at Savannah in September, with his fleet & a considerable Land force—with a design of striking a blow against the Enemy in that quarter—which from his vast superiority he was easily able to do, if they have not found means of escaping. His arrival there of itself was very interesting—and if it has been attended with all the expected success—He will have crushed the Enemy and relieved Georgia & South Carolina from the dangers which had already in great part overwhelmed  the One, and from which the Other was not entirely free." Washington's hopes for D'Estaing's success at Savannah were in vain. The "advices from the Southward" that eventually reached the Commander were devastating: "At Savannah," summarized Mark Boatner, D'Estaing "capped an inept career and brought American disenchantment with French military assistance to a demoralized low."

In the lengthy postscript, Washington returns to the idea of a Continental expedition against Detroit; this proposal would be revisted in both 1780 and 1781, but no such mission was ever launched. "You will let me know by the first opportunity what Military stores & Artillery will be necessary, in case an Expedition should be undertaken against Detroit—and whether they could be supplied at Fort Pitt or what part of them. If ... you should have reason to conclude the expedition will be undertaken; and the Military Stores essential for it cannot be furnished at Pittsburg—You will apply to the Board of War in the first instance to prevent delay, to whom I have written and requested that they may be supplied. You will, however take the earliest Opportunity to furnish me with an Estimate as above required, both of the Cannon &c & Stores and of any deficiency. And indeed I wish to have a Return of the Military Stores of the Garrison & Cannon, particularly distinguishing, whether any of the Latter & of what size are on travelling Carriages."