Lincoln, Abraham, as Sixteenth President

Autograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln"), 1 1/2 pages (8 x 5 in.; 203 x 123 mm) on a bifolium of Executive Mansion letterhead, Washington, 26 September 1862, to Major John J. Key, docketed on verso of second leaf "President Lincoln's Letter"; leaves separated at central fold. some neatly repaired fold separations.

Parke-Bernet, 20 November 1956, lot 191 (undesignated consignor)

See The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Basler, 5:442-43, for a later autograph transcription of this letter, with related documents, made by Lincoln about 14 October 1862. The present original letter to Key is not located by Basler. For related documents cited, see the online Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/malhome.html).

Autograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln"), 1 1/2 pages (8 x 5 in.; 203 x 123 mm) on a bifolium of Executive Mansion letterhead, Washington, 26 September 1862, to Major John J. Key, docketed on verso of second leaf "President Lincoln's Letter"; leaves separated at central fold. some neatly repaired fold separations.
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Lincoln's original letter to John Key, demanding that the Major prove that he did not say that the Civil War was a "game," the object of which was to "make a compromise and save slavery"—sent just four days after he issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

The case of John J. Key's dismissal from the Union Army was one of Lincoln's most significant acts of military discipline during his tenure as commander-in-chief. With the Civil War at a crucial point, the President made clear that he was leading an effort for total Northern victory and full reunification of the country; he was unwilling to brook the possibility of any compromise with the Confederacy, particularly on the issue of slavery.

John Key was a district judge in Indiana when he resigned to take up the uniform of the Union Army. He was attached as an adjutant to General Henry Halleck at the time that McClellan and Hooker fought Lee's Army of Northern Virginia to a bloody draw at Antietam, 17 September 1862. It was widely believed at the time that McClellan was overly cautious and might have been able to decisively defeat the Confederates had he pursued them more aggressively. Word subsequently reached Lincoln—who was then finalizing the Emancipation Proclamation which declared free all slaves in any state of the Confederacy that did not return to the Union by 1 January 1863—that when Major Levi Turner asked Key why McClellan did not pursue his seeming advantage more vigorously, Key replied "That is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise, and save slavery."

The President must have begun an investigation into the matter almost immediately. On 22 September he received a letter from Benjamin F. Fifield and H. Tyler who claimed that they were in daily contact with Major Key and had not ever heard him speak of compromise with the South. To the contrary, they wrote, Key had stated that "The Government should be sustained, even if it made the South a desert waste." Lincoln was not dissuaded, however, and on 26 September he sent this sharp request to Key. The White House retained copy was docketed by John Hay, noting that the original was "delivered to Major Key at 10.25 a.m. Sept. 27."

"I am informed that in answer to the question, 'Why was not the rebel army bagged immediately after the battle of Sharpsburg?' propounded to you by Major Levi C. Turner, Judge Advocate &c. you answered 'That is not the game' 'The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise, and save slavery'

"I shall be very happy if you will, within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this, prove to me by Major Turner, that you did not, either literally, or in substance, make the answer stated." Although Lincoln almost invariably concluded his letters "Yours truly," the closing of this letter is truncated to simply "Yours."

The very morning that Key received this letter he and Major Turner were questioned by Lincoln. In the "Record of Dismissal" that he wrote out the next month, Lincoln recalled that "Major Key did not attempt to controvert the statement of Major Turner; but simply insisted, and sought to prove, that he was true to the Union. The substance of the President's reply was that if there was a 'game' ever among Union men, to have our army not take an advantage of the enemy when it could, it was his object to break up that game." Lincoln rendered his decision virtually on the spot: "In my view it is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done. Therefore let Major John J. Key be forthwith dismissed from the Military service of the United States" (Basler 5:442-43).

Key's dismissal was classified as an honorable discharge, but that brought him little solace. He wrote several times to Lincoln to plead his case, but the President would not be moved. He needed an example to prevent similar war-weary compromise sentiments from spreading among the Union officer corps. Key wrote again when his son died of wounds received at Perryville, Kentucky. Lincoln sent a sympathetic response, 24 November 1862, but he also reiterated the necessity of Key's removal: "In regard to my dismissal of yourself from the military service, it seems to me you misunderstand me. I did not charge, or intend to charge you with disloyalty. I had been brought to fear that there was a class of officers in the army, not very inconsiderable in numbers, who were playing a game to not beat the enemy when they could, on some peculiar notion as to the proper way of saving the Union; and when you were proved to me, in your own presence, to have avowed yourself in favor of that 'game,' and did not attempt to controvert the proof, I dismissed you as an example and a warning to that supposed class. I bear you no ill will; and I regret that I could not have the example without wounding you personally. But can I now, in view of the public interest, restore you to the service, by which the army would understand that I indorse and approve that game myself? If there was any doubt of your having made the avowal, the case would be different. But when it was proved to me, in your presence, you did not deny or attempt to deny it, but confirmed it in my mind, by attempting to sustain the position of the argument" (Basler 5:508).

Major John Key had the misfortune to speak to the wrong person at the wrong time. In the aftermath of Antietam and Lincoln's issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on 22 September 1862, "the entire aspect of the war [changed] from a political affair to preserve the Union to a crusade to free the slaves" (Boatner). President Lincoln simply could not countenance any "game-playing" amongst his officers.