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Lincoln, Abraham, as Sixteenth President
Description
Condition
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Catalogue Note
Lincoln admits to Halleck the error of the military strategy he had pressed on General Hunter: "it was regarded by friends and enemies as a retreat—discouraging the former and encouraging the latter."
Lincoln's well-known tendency to interfere in military planning was particularly pronounced at the beginning of the war, when many Union commanders had little battlefield experience. The temptation to proffer advice was was especially difficult to resist in cases when the commander in question was a personal friend of Lincoln. So on 24 October 1861, the President felt free to advise General David Hunter, commanding in Missouri, whose promotion he had rapidly accelerated: "The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions ... give up the pursuit of [Confederate General Sterling Price], halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia, and the other Rolla ... then recruit the condition of both corps" (Basler V:1).
When Lincoln advised Hunter, Missouri was on the brink of chaos; by the time he sent the present letter to Halleck, the state had gone over the precipice. John C. Frémont was the first Union commander in the West, but the Pathfinder was more concerned with freeing slaves within the ostensibly loyal Union state than he was in advancing the President's war agenda. The Union supply system was inefficient and rife with corruption. And, most damaging, Union loyalists felt unprotected against the marauding forays of Confederate General Price.
Some constituents of Lincoln's formally complained of the situation, and while Lincoln readily acknowledged his part in creating the turmoil in Missouri, he was just as ready to pass the complaint on to Henry Halleck, the commander of the newly constituted Department of the Missouri, for solution.
"You remember my showing you a copy of my letter, upon which Gen. Hunter removed our forces back from Springfield to Rolla and Sedalia. This movement had one bad effect not anticipated by me—towit, that it was regarded by friends and enemies as a retreat—discouraging the former and encouraging the latter, as appears by the within memorial, & otherwise. I write this in the Adjutant Generals's office in presence of Gen. Thomas and Gen. McClellan, from whom I learn that your attention is already directed to the subject treated of in the memorial. I write this, not to make any complaint, but merely to say I shall be very glad for you to do the best you can for the people represented herein. The means & mode you must judge of."
Halleck thought it vital to hold Rolla and Sedalia for the security of St. Louis, which was located north-east of the two depots, but he also initiated a vigorous pursuit of Price, who was soon forced to withdraw into Arkansas. Missouri remained relatively stable in the Union camp for the rest of the war.
The failure of Lincoln's proposed strategy, and Hunter's subsequent removal from command, put a strain on the two men's friendship that was never fully healed.
Not in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Basler, and apparently unpublished.