Washington, George | At the beginning of the Yorktown Campaign, Washington smooths over a misunderstanding with the French commanders

Washington, George

Autograph letter signed ("Go: Washington") as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, to François-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, apologizing for a misunderstanding with his French allies 

3 pages (229 x 189 mm) on a bifolium, New Windsor, 13 June 1781; a couple of small ink spots. Half red morocco slipcase, chemise.  

A significant letter, underscoring the vital role of the Chevalier de Chastellux as the principal liaison officer between the Comte de Rochambeau, commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary Force, and George Washington. The Comte de Rochambeau arrived at Newport in the summer of 1780 commanding some 5,500 French troops. After the French had languished in Newport for nearly a year later, Rochambeau and Washington met in Wethersfield, Connecticut, in May 1781, to plan a joint offensive. The meeting was prompted by Rochambeau having been told that Admiral François-Joseph de Grasse was sailing with a large fleet to the West Indies and would be available to support a summer campaign in America.

The two generals agreed that the French land forces would join the Continental Army in attacking the British at New York City, while the French fleet would remove to Boston. However, at a French Council of War later that same month, it was determined that the fleet should remain at Newport—a decision that both surprised and infuriated Washington, who evidently did not disguise his reaction to Armand Louis de Gontaut, duc de Lauzun (later duc de Biron), who had brought him the news. After receiving an explanatory letter from Chastellux, Washington here makes amends.

"I fear from the purport of the letter you did me the honor to write from Newport on the 9th, that my sentiments respecting the Council of War held on board the Duke de Burgoyne (the 31st of May) have been misconceiv’d; and I shall be very unhappy if they receive an interpretation different from the true intent & meaning of them—If this is the case, it can only be attributed to my not understanding the business of the Duke de Lauzen perfectly.—I will rely therefore on your goodness & candor to explain & rectify the mistake if any has happened.

"My wishes, perfectly coincided with the determination of the Board of War to continue the Fleet at Rhode Island—provided it could remain there in safety with the force required; and did not impede the March of the Army towards the North River; but when Duke Lauzen informed me, that my opinion of the propriety, and safety of this measure was required by the Board, and that he came hither at the particular desire of the Counts Rochambeau & de Barras to obtain it; I was reduced to the painful necessity of delivering a sentiment different from that of a most respectable Board, or of forfeiting all pretensions to candor by the concealm’t of it.—

"Upon this ground it was I wrote to the Generals to the effect I did, and not because I was dissatisfied at the alteration of the plan agreed to at Weathersfield.—My fears for the safety of the Fleet—which I am now perswaded were carried too far—were productive of a belief that the Generals, when seperated, might feel uneasy at every misterious preparation of the enemy, and occasion a fresh call for Militia—this had some weight in my determination to give Boston (where I was sure no danger could be encountered but that of a Blockade) a preference to Newport, where, under some circumstances, though not such as were likely to happen, something might be enterprized.

"The Fleet being at Rhode Island, is attended, certainly, with many advantages in the operations proposed—And I entreat that you, and the Gentleman who were of opinion that it ought to be risqued there for these purposes will be assured, that I have a high sense of the obligations you meant to confer on America by that resolve—and that your Zeal to promote the common cause, & my anxiety for the safety of so valuable a fleet, were the only motives which gave birth to the apparent difference in our opinions.—

"I set that value upon your friendship and candor—and have that implicit belief in your attachment to America, that they are only to be equalled by the sincerity with which I have the honor to be Dr Sir—Yr. Most Obedt. & obliged Hble Serv."

The misapprehension between the allied armies would soon be forgotten. French troops had already begun leaving Newport two days before Washington wrote the present letter, and by 6 July they had reached White Plains, where they were reviewed by Washington. After reconnoitering General Sir Henry Clinton's fortifications at New York and determining them too strong to attack, the combined armies turned southward for Yorktown. There Lord Cornwallis's army was besieged by some 18,000 ground troops (almost equally divided between French and American), supported by more than 28,000 French sailors and marines commanded by Admiral de Grasse, who had taken Chesapeake Bay (the French siege munitions sailed from Newport with Admiral de Barras, mentioned here by Washington). On 19 October the British surrendered and the "World Turned Upside Down."

PROVENANCE

François-Jean de Beauvoir, Marquis de Chastellux, by descent (discreet blindstamp of the Archives de Chastellux) to — Comte Louis de Chastellux (Christie's New York, 4 December 2017, lot 6)

REFERENCE

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-06044 (Early Access Document, the Papers of George Washington; Writings of George Washington, ed. Fitzpatrick, 22:204–05 (text from letterbook, with many variations from the sent letter in punctuation, spelling, capitalization, and paragraphing)