Ibn Saud, King Abdul Aziz--Clayton, Sir Gilbert.

Principally aimed at resolving issues concerning the desert border with Iraq, providing a unique and detailed insight into Anglo-Saudi relations in the years immediately preceding the foundation of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The archive, in total 332 pages, derives from the British Consulate and Agency at Jeddah, the consul being successively F.H.W. Stonehewer Bird then H.G. Jakins, and comprises: detailed reports by Clayton on his twelve meetings with the King in Jeddah between 8 and 20 May, and three further meetings between 1 and 3 August, typescripts with a small number of manuscript corrections, 64 pages; four letters by Ibn Saud with the royal seal, with English translations, to the British Consul at Jeddah, including one long letter summarising his position that the disputed territories were historically part of Nejd and criticising the British ("...this reply from the British Government not only destroys all our hopes for a settlement of the matter but is an arrow directed towards our confidence in the conversations we had with the British representative at Uqair..."), with other letters concerning the timing of talks and apologising for his delay in replying to letters, seven pages, 19 February 1926 to 10 December 1928, and a draft translation of a letter by Ibn Saud to Clayton complaining of Iraqi incursions into his territory, 2 pages, 22 May 1928; British draft communiqué to Ibn Saud admitting the failure of the negotiations with Clayton and proposing the independent arbitration of the dispute, seven pages, 8 November 1928, together with a translation into Arabic and also copy letters by Jakins to Ibn Saud with Arabic translations; correspondence with the King's foreign ministers, mostly cover-letters or dealing with practicalities, including one letter signed by Abdullah Damluji and five letters signed by Fuad Hamza; Clayton's correspondence, including five telegrams by him to the Foreign Secretary on the state of the negotiations, one recommending a temporary postponement (three pages, 15 May) and one on their failure (two pages, 7 August), a copy letter from the Foreign office to Clayton outlining the British position before the resumption of talks (six pages, 19 July 1928), a copy letter by Clayton to Ibn Saud on his return to London (5 September 1928), and telegrams from Clayton to the High Commissioner in Iraq about Ibn Saud's complaints of incursions into his territory, together with replies, 22-25 May 1928;  copy of a despatch by the High Commissioner in Iraq to the Foreign Secretary expressing concern at the conclusion of Clayton's mission, five pages, 12 August 1928; correspondence between the Consul at Jeddah and the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London, and the British High Commissions in Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine, discussing the substance of the negotiations, notably a long letter signed by Monteagle of the Foreign Office to Jakins outlining the history of the dispute and negotiations leading to the November communiqué to Ibn Saud (11 pages, 1 November 1928), the opinions of the various parties, the current location of tribal groups near the Iraq-Nejd border, as well as logistics and practicalities; two draft press releases from the Jeddah consulate, May and August 1928, and cuttings from Hansard and the British press; mostly typescripts, a mixture of top copies and carbons with duplicates of some items, chiefly folio, most items docketed with original file references (file 1074 numbers 1 to 133) from the British Consul in Jeddah, also with some later photographs and glass-plate negatives (of Clayton's funeral and other subjects), each leaf separately housed in a melinex sleeve, in three boxes, also with the boards of two original folders (both labelled "File No. 1074. Sir Gilbert Clayton's Mission to Ibn Saud. 1928" and one additionally labelled "Secret") and a note dated 1933 on the disposal of the papers

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"...We further protest against aeroplanes harming the peaceful tribes and lastly request Your Excellency to convey this to the British Government and to explain to them that those in Iraq who adhere to this attitude will only bring bad results. Particularly you know the great efforts we exerted to calm the people of Nejd and to make them give up the intentions they had towards Iraq. If we try all methods to calm them and the Iraq Government destroys what we build and breaks what we agree upon, in what way can we answer the people of Nejd and how can we keep them calm and how quieten their excitement?" (Ibn Saud to Sir Gilbert Clayton, 22 May 1928)

Three files of papers, deriving from the British Consulate in Jeddah, relate to a series of meetings held in Jeddah in 1928 between Clayton and Ibn Saud to resolve points of difference relating to the borders of Saud's expanding kingdom, then known as the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, which had not been resolved in the previous year's Treaty of Jeddah.

The most significant issue was the establishment of several military outposts – or, according to the British, police stations – at wells in the desert border region between British Mandate Iraq and Ibn Saud's kingdom. To Ibn Saud these posts were a military threat, whereas the British saw them as necessary to the maintenance of internal order in Iraq. In 1927 an outpost at Al Busayyah was attacked by Bedouin and its inhabitants massacred; the British had responded with aerial bombing over the Saudi border of tribes suspected of taking part in the massacre. The two sides had differing interpretations of the 1922 Uqair Protocol that had settled the border between Iraq and Nejd, which stated that no military construction should take place in the vicinity of the border. The British position was made clear by in a telegram from the Foreign Secretary following consultation with Sir Percy Cox, British negotiator of the Protocol, on 1 August 1928: "The object of the agreement was to define the boundary within which on the Iraq side Iraqi tribes could graze in security and across which Nejdian tribes could graze in security and across which the Nejdian tribes might not raid. Sir Percy Cox  cannot admit [that the] words 'in the vicinity of' either in the English or Arabic versions were intended to extend to the distance claimed by Ibn Saud and states that the words signified in his own mind, and, he is sure, that of Ibn Saud at the time 'within rifle shot or within sight of' tribes using water holes on frontier. He regards the ten or fifteen miles from the frontier as a most liberal estimate."

This was more than a technical dispute over wording: to the British it was a matter of establishing Iraq as a modern state with clearly defined borders, while the Bedouin saw the imposition of borders and military defence of oases as a threat to their ancient nomadic lifestyle. Clayton explained this in a telegram to the Foreign Secretary (15 May 1928): "[Ibn Saud's] people do not discriminate between military and police posts both of which they regard as preventing free movement throughout the desert and also as bases for offensive action against them in the future as they have been during the recent operations". These detailed records of extensive talks shed fascinating light on Ibn Saud's complex negotiating position, keenly aware of his people's traditions and sensitivities but also with a sophisticated understanding of international law and the integrity of borders; on the one hand he emphasised to the British the fiercely independent nature of the Bedouin tribes, and on the other complained vociferously against incursions into his territory by the RAF. 

Clayton's initial position was complicated by a large consignment of arms that had been purchased by Ibn Saud, as his instructions from the Foreign Secretary on 1 May made clear: "...You should report two or three days after your arrival at Jedda whether you consider consignment of 2 million cartridges for Ibn Saud should be sent on to Jedda at once or not. You will understand that HMG cannot take responsibility of allowing British made ammunition to go into Ibn Saud's hands unless they have reasonable security that it will not be employed against any of His Majesty's forces..." There was also anxiety on the British side that objections could be raised to other structures, as is made clear in a fleeting reference by Clayton to Ibn Saud that "possibly in the future the trace of an oil pine-line" might be built in the desert. On the Saudi side, a very different issue was seen as a cause of the problem: at one meeting Ibn Saud told Clayton that "the trouble had its origin in the old hostility of the Hashemites to him and his people. When King Faisal was set up on the throne of Iraq and the Amir Abdullah made ruler of Transjordan, the people of Najd felt that those measures were designed to encircle their country with a chain of hostile Hashemite rulers, and they saddled the British Government with the designs and nefarious activities of the two brothers and their father".  

By early November it was evident that agreement was not going to be reached so a communiqué to Ibn Saud was drafted (multiple drafts of which, in both English and Arabic, are found in the archive) summarising the British position that Iraq is entitled "to carry out such measures of internal administration within its territory as it may from time to time think necessary", but that the desert posts "were not intended to interfere with the customary rights of grazing or watering enjoyed by Nejd tribes, or to hamper their lawful movements and migration across the desert areas of South-Western Iraq", and suggesting that these points of difference be submitted to an external arbiter. Ibn Saud responded on 10 December in a letter to the British agent in Jeddah which agreed to arbitration (with carefully considered provisos) but reasserted his belief that the treaty forbad the military posts, asserted that historically "It was the Amirs of Nejd who governed those deserts" which had only been surrendered with great reluctance and on condition of the constraints on military presence, and reiterated his belief that Iraq had acted dishonestly throughout ("...Our lands were taken at Uqair and yesterday Our agreement was broken in the erection of buildings which she called guard posts and to reassure Us affirmed that they are only police stations. But she did not wait from eve till morn before changing those guard posts into strong fortifications containing all the requirements of military citadels and fortresses. She is able every day to invent a reason and make stations in lands which are without doubt Nejdi to expose Nejd to all sorts of harms such as the aeropplanes and cars drawn from those stations which unjustifiably penetrated our territories even in the days of the negotiations...")

The Clayton-Ibn Saud meetings covered many subjects other than outposts in the Iraqi desert. The other British administered territory bordering the kingdom was Transjordan and a number of lengthy telegrams from the British High Commissioner outline his broadly unsympathetic view of his southern neighbour, especially over cross-border raids: "Ibn Saud['s] promises to punish guilty and recover stolen property ... Have not been fulfilled. Only small proportion of loot has been returned, payment has not been made on account of killed and men guilty of rape have not been punished..." There was also extensive discussion, including a six page memorandum, on Ibn Saud's relationship with Yemen and her close ally Italy.  

We have no record of any comparable archive having been offered at auction.